Ontologising social justice in decolonised and post-apartheid settings by Ntshoe, I.M.
South African Journal of Higher Education     https://dx.doi.org/10.20853/34-3   
Volume 34 | Number 3 | 2020 | pages 263‒280   eISSN 1753-5913 
263 
 
ONTOLOGISING SOCIAL JUSTICE IN DECOLONISED AND POST-
APARTHEID SETTINGS  
 
I.M. Ntshoe 
Centre for Innovation in Teaching and Learning 
Central University of Technology 
Bloemfontein, South Africa 
e-mail: intshoe@cut.ac.za / https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2038-1723 
 
ABSTRACT  
One topical issue in South Africa since the 1994 democratic elections is how a socially just higher 
education may be advanced in the context of the decolonial demand for the recognition of diverse 
epistemologies in the curriculum. The challenge since 1994 however has been what social justice 
means in the decolonial and post-apartheid settings where injustices continue to be perpetrated 
on the basis of race, albeit covertly. This article examines African and South African 
epistemologies and ontologies of social justice, in the context of decoloniality and curricula 
transformation in higher education, that became more pronounced through the #Feesmustfall 
protests in 2015. I argue that while social justice occurs within particular historical and political 
contexts, it is necessary to discern some ontologies of social justice that are not necessarily 
reducible to contexts. Use is made of Realist (R), Critical Realist (CR) and Race Realist Theory 
(RRT) perspective to unpack paradoxical constructions of social justice in post-colonial and post-
apartheid South Africa.  
Keywords: African epistemologies, postcoloniality, racial realist, ontologies, relativist 
epistemologies, social justice 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The call for higher education to advance social justice in Africa generally, and in South Africa 
as the country enters its third decade of democracy, intersects with the of discourse decolonial 
and the transformation of curricula and knowledge to address deep-seated past political, social 
and economic injustices (Fataar 2018).  
Despite divergent perspectives, there is agreement that social justice is a multidimensional 
concept that includes material redistribution, and a participative citizenship that recognises and 
encompasses civil, political and social rights (Frelin 2014). What warrants further analysis 
however are underlying ontologies and epistemologies of social justice in the discussions of 
curriculum transformation and knowledge in higher education in the decolonial and post-
apartheid epochs.  
Blaikie describes ontology as “conjectures on social reality, something that exists and 
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units making up reality and their interactions” (paraphrased by Grix 2004, 59). Ontology 
therefore refers to the study of something existing as a reality, or beliefs about the nature of 
reality and being (Lincoln and Guba 2000; Mack 2010; Merricks 2007). Conversely, 
epistemological beliefs are about the character and attainment of knowledge (Merricks 2007). 
For Crotty, “epistemology is the conjecture of knowledge entrenched in the speculative outlook 
and methodology” (1998, 3). 
Accordingly, epistemology is shaped by peoples’ ontological frames that enables persons 
to ascertain what constitutes knowledge and how this knowledge is produced to explain 
existence (Mack 2010). Ryan (1970) argues that our worldview and how we interpret the world 
and how we locate ourselves in it depends on our ontological being. Thus, “ontology and 
epistemology form a paradigm” (Mack 2010, 5). 
My article explores advancement of a shared ontology to frame discussions of advancing 
social justice and transformation of higher education curriculum in the decolonial and post-
apartheid periods in South Africa, and African settings in general. I argue that social justice 
inevitably operates within particular contexts and therefore intersects with the decoloniality 
agenda and post-apartheid discourses to transform curricula and knowledge by reimagining 
alternative epistemologies and ontologies to which students should be exposed. I further argue 
that although social justice policies and practices are conceptualised and implemented in 
different contexts, it is possible and necessary to develop a shared ontology of social justice 
regardless of contexts.  
I rely on Realist (R), Critical Realist Theory (CRT) and Race Realist Theory (RRT) to 
counter seeming relativist, empirical and idealist epistemologies in developing a shared 
ontology of social justice in the post-colonial and post-apartheid settings.  
 
CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
A balancing of differences and similarities in discussions of social justice in different contexts 
is required to address inequities and gaps around social justice in societies (Adams, Bell and 
Griffin 2007). This calls for appreciating the individuality of people and of the multiplicities of 
realities people experience in daily life (Bauman 1997; Bauman and Donskis 2013; Frelin 2014; 
Ross 2007).  
Nancy Fraser (2008; 2009) much of whose works on social justice have been appropriated 
by other authors (Leibowitz and Bozalek 2015a; De Sousa Santos 2001) identified economic, 
cultural and political structures that can either militate against or contribute to development of 
a socially just pedagogy. Fraser’s theory of social justice focuses on the construction of 
redistribution and recognition of ethnic and “racial”, sexual and gender differences which puts 
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recognition at the centre (Fraser 2008; 2009). Justice from this relational perspective highlights 
the dynamics and complexities of realities, where people express their values and cultures 
contribute to shared social forms (Fraser 1989; Young 1990). Drawing on Fraser’s work, De 
Sousa Santos argues that meaningful social justice without acknowledging recognition of 
differences and redistribution of resources is impossible (De Sousa Santos 2001). 
Furthermore, a distinction is sometimes made between the broad and holistic approach, 
and the narrow, atomistic approach to social justice (Englund 1986). The narrow approach has 
been criticised (Edling  2015; De los Reyes and Martinsson 2005; Edling and Frelin 2013; 
Kumashiro 2002; Lloyd 1983) for: 
 
• Celebrating polarity which places people in into categories; 
• Accommodating stereotypes that deny differences; 
• Emphasising neutrality while neglecting power-relations (Edling  2015); 
• Asserting that absolute truth may be reached while neglecting difference, inconsistency, 
and insecurity; and, 
• Celebrating empirically observed phenomena whilst ignoring covert forms of violence.  
 
Similarly, positivism has also been critisised for neglecting the multiplicity of social justice in 
normal actions (Cochran-Smith and Zeichner 2005; Edling  2015; Frelin 2014). 
Drawing on Fraser’s work (1996), Leibowitz and Bozalek (2015a) propose a 
transformative social justice pedagogy to capacitate students to disrupt existing institutionalised 
cultural patterns that devalue indigenous knowledges in South Africa (Leibowitz and Bozalek 
2015b).  
 
RELATIVIST EPISTEMOLOGIES AND REALIST AND CRITICAL REALIST 
ONTOLOGIES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
Relativist epistemology  
Grounded on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-realist tradition, relativist epistemology is one of a 
range of intellectual movements including radical feminism, cultural studies, 
deconstructionism, and post-modernism.  
Although Thomas Kuhn (1970) never considered himself a relativist, he has nonetheless 
been associated with epistemological relativism because of his notion of communities of 
paradigm through which he argues that different scientists or groups may interpret and apply 
paradigms in different ways. In denying this association, Kuhn argues that his view that new 
Ntshoe Ontologising social justice in decolonised and post-apartheid settings 
266 
scientific theories which emerged as a result of revolution replace earlier ones and are better as 
problem-solving frameworks, matrices and instruments does not amount to relativism 
(paraphrased by Chalmers 1978, 107). Conversely, Kuhn claims that the term “paradigm” does 
not denote relativity in problem-solving but rather denotes frameworks that should guide 
research in future (Kuhn 1970, 157‒8).  
Kuhn’s epistemological relativism questions the classic scientific realist’s idea that 
science progresses by approaching the truth, and argues instead that scientific progress rather 
has to be understood in terms of revolutionary changes of scientific paradigm (Schantz and 
Seide 2011, 18). Thus, scientific communities often “delineate theories they accept and propose 
canons governing what constitutes reality and acceptable research” (Ryan 1970, 142). Scientists 
are normally guided by paradigms in which they work, and as a result, proponents of rival 
paradigms live in different worlds (Chalmers 1978, 96). A paradigm is a worldview and 
experiences shared by a particular group; further, one needs to know the individualities of the 
group that created and use it (Kuhn 1970, 94, quoted by Chalmers 1978, 107). Paradigms are 
judged as “relative standards ‘appropriate to community’, and these standards will vary with 
the cultural and historical setting of the community” (Chalmers 1978, 107). Scientific 
communities supporting particular paradigms will adopt different strategies and therefore arrive 
at different conclusions to identical problems (Chalmers 1978).  
  
Relativist epistemology of social justice 
In terms of the relativist position, what counts as a socially just higher education curriculum 
will vary from one context to the other, depending on existing power relations, cultural and 
ideological beliefs, social and historical background, and values espoused by individuals and 
communities in particular contexts. 
Scientific communities of paradigm and individuals decide which theories and 
epistemologies are suitable for understanding justice in higher education curricula. These 
communities are likely to disagree on solving problems of inequity, denial of access to 
education, or strategies to advance social justice in different contexts, and are therefore likely 
to develop multiple strategies. A scientific view of social justice involves subjective elements 
influenced by the awareness that a socially just higher education can only be attained by positive 
discrimination in favour of marginalised groups. A scientific paradigm of social justice requires 
knowledge of the characteristics of a particular group. Priority must therefore be placed on 
recognition of ethnic, racial, and sexual minority needs and gender differences.  
More importantly, transformative social justice in higher education can only be realised 
by acknowledging the uniqueness of people and their experiences. In South Africa, race and 
Ntshoe Ontologising social justice in decolonised and post-apartheid settings 
267 
gender as social constructions are critical to explain social inequities in higher education 
curricula and in societies, and therefore non-racial and non-sexist strategies need to be 
developed to address inequities in contexts. Recently, there has been a clarion call to infuse 
indigenous knowledge systems and epistemologies in higher education curricula and to 
recognise what students and communities experience. In particular, critical pedagogy has been 
proposed to drive transformative social justice in order to allow students to challenge prevailing 
cultural patterns that currently value race and related categories, and devalue indigenous 
knowledge (Leibowitz 2017, 105). 
 
Realist (R) and Critical Realist (CR) ontologies  
Ontology according to realist philosophy exists as independent reality and therefore differs from 
epistemology in this respect (Wikgren 2004, 13). Thus, ontological realism recognises that 
knowledge is about something other than itself and that there exists a reality beyond our 
symbolic realm (Maton and Moore 2010). In contrast to positivism and constructivism, CR, 
which moves from the same premise as R, asserts that only part of reality can be explained in 
terms of human knowledge (Fletcher 2017, 182). Knowledge creation in CR ontology is a 
production of new meanings constructed from prevailing meanings that have irreducible 
qualities (Moore 2013, 344). Thus, social reality consists of social structures that exist 
“independently of the various ways in which they can be discursively constructed and 
interpreted by social scientists and other social actors located in a wide range of sociohistorical 
situations” (Reed 2001, quoted by Wikgren 2004, 14).  
CR realist ontology developed to challenge philosophical slants comprising positivism, 
post-modernism, and neo-Kantianism and pragmatism (Wikgren 2004, 13). CR challenges the 
absolutism of positivism, questioning the assertion that observed regularities are facts in 
themselves but rather products of scientific experiments (Lincoln and Guba 2000; Fletcher 
2017; Moore 2013; Wikgren 2004).  
Similarly, the relativism of constructivism and post-modernism are equally questioned by 
the CR ontology, which argues that reality has objective and independent existence of our 
thoughts rather than the way people in particular understand it (Wheelahan 2010). Conversely, 
CR assumes the world is designed in a particular way that is distinct from the way we think 
about it (Wheelahan 2010, 53).  
Following CR ontology, understanding and changing the social world can only be 
explained provided that the structures that produce actions and conversations are recognised 
(Wikgren 2004). The real comprises structures and their associated reproductive methods and 
not “theoretical entities” or “logical constructs” (Collier 1994, 45). Structures generate the 
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events that happen, and the things we experience (Wheelahan, 2010). The realm of empirical 
consists of that which people experience directly or indirectly (Collier 1994, 45) (paraphrased 
by Bergin, Wells and Owen 2008). The incidents generating our practice must be produced in 
the real, and occur in the actual domain. In describing the features of CR ontology, Bhaskar 
(1998b, 170) distinguishes constructs and reproductive procedures, with the former consisting 
of internally related objects or practices, and generative mechanisms comprising causal powers 
governing ways of acting of structured things. Bhaskar (1998a) warns that empirical realism, 
which confines the real to what is experienced, collapses the three domains (the real, actual and 
empirical) into one domain (Wheelahan 2010, 60). Moore (2013, 343) extends this feature of 
CR by distinguishing between the intransitive realm that is transcendental, and the transitive 
that is a time-specific dimension.  
 
R, CR and Race Realist Theory (RRT) ontologies of social justice  
In contrast to relativist epistemology, the ontological realist approach in this article views social 
justice as existing as real, actual and empirical, and not as social constructions developed within 
fields of practice with socially developed and applied procedures (see Maton and Moore 2010). 
Social justice comprises social structures that exist independently of different ways in which 
scientific communities construct and interpret them in different contexts. Social justice reality 
is structured in a particular way; it is the structures of social justice and not the structures of 
people’s minds that make their knowledge of social justice possible. Knowledge creation of 
social justice reality in R and CR ontology is a form of production, and new meanings construct 
and transform existing meanings of social justice, which has its own irreducible qualities (see 
Maton and Moore 2010).  
The domain of the actual in social justice, on the other hand, relates to the fact that social 
justice is concrete and not an abstraction of our social constructions. The empirical domain of 
social justice, namely ontology, means that even though social justice is real and actual, social 
justice also comprises our experiences. However, this contrasts with positivist epistemology 
that asserts that social justice can be empirically determined. Conversely, social justice ontology 
implies that experience of social justice is created in of the sphere the real but occurs in the 
realm of the actual. Accordingly, the real, actual and empirical within social justice are merely 
kept apart but not collapsed into one domain of the empirical, whereby the real of social justice 
is restricted to that which we can experience (Wheelahan 2010, 60). In this sense, CR ontology 
safeguards the three spheres and ascribes the real to people’s experiences of social justice in the 
social world. 
Complementing R and CR, and expanding them somewhat in my article, is what Derrick 
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Bell (1992) calls Race Realist Theory (RRT), an account of race as reality. RRT is briefly 
outlined below to explain its bearing on discussions of race as reality in the debate about social 
justice in South Africa. First, Bell reviewed the case Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which set the 
groundwork for the infamous principle that separate facilities for Blacks and Whites were 
constitutional as long as they were equal (Bell 2004). This Supreme Court decision therefore 
endorsed the legality of racial segregation which became to be known as the “separate but 
equal” principle for public facilities as long as such segregated facilities were equal. Contrary 
to the general endorsement of the court’s decision to negate the “separate but equal” principle 
in the well-known Brown vs Board of Education 1954 case, however, Bell (2004) differed with 
the general view that the abolition of “separate but equal policy” in this latter case was 
progressive in accelerating desegregation. Rather than embracing this decision, Bell argues that 
the Native Americans would have been in a better position regarding the implementation of 
“separate but equal” status if the court in Brown had rejected arguments to overturn the decision 
that enforced a “separate but equal” for races other than the Caucasian race in the US (Adams 
et al. 2007; Allen 2006; Allen et al. 2006; Mack 2006). Bell’s argument was that Brown v. 
Board of Education was considered more “symbolic than real” (Allen et al. 2006, 19) because 
it focussed exclusively on the inequality of the schools, and therefore did not provide any 
significant changes (Allen et al. 2006, 158). 
In his criticism of this celebrated decision declaring the “separate but equal” principle 
unconstitutional, Bell, used the RRT approach to argue that justice would have been better 
served had the courts argued for the retention of the “equal” part of the doctrine. 
 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICAN AND OTHER CONTEXTS OF 
DECOLONISATION AND DECOLONIALITY 
The discourses around creating a socially just society in the post-colonial context, including 
South Africa, are shaped by narratives of decolonization and decoloniality, both of which 
claims for the recognition of the African episteme and epistemology are articulated in works of 
Ngũgĩ wa Thionga (1986) and Achille Mbembe (2015; 2016), among others.  
A distinction between decolonization and decoloniality is in order. Decolonisation refers 
to the “withdrawal of direct colonialism from the colonies as well as the struggles ranged 
against those empires that were reluctant to do so” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 13). Decoloniality 
on the other could be described as a period that post-colonial countries find themselves in long 
after having gained independence from previous colonizers. The term therefore refers to the 
period following decolonization (Maldonado-Torres 2007). It is therefore different to 
decolonialism in that it describes political and economic relations between former colonising 
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and colonized countries several years after decolonization debates (Mignolo 2005). This period 
should therefore entail understanding the socio-economic dynamics in Africa as a product of 
years of fighting against oppression then and currently (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 13; Motta 2013; 
Ramoupi 2011; 2014).  
Thus, decoloniality is necessary to understand how for example people in post-colonial 
countries such as South Africa continue to feel the effects of colonisation and apartheid in 
economics and higher education curricula. 
Since my discussions of social justice are located within the decolonial and post-apartheid 
eras, it is necessary to highlight the distinction of these two from the decolonisation movement. 
The proponents of the decolonial movement argue that the difference between this movement 
and the decolonisation movement lies in that the latter was and still is considered a critique of 
European epistemologies; decoloniality is a critique of both the European epistemologies and 
of Third World epistemologies that tend to generate into essentialism (See, Grosfoguel 2001; 
2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). Post-apartheid on the other hand describes the period following 
the inception of democratic elections of 1994 but also located within the current decolonial 
setting.  
Significantly, debates about creating a socially just higher education inevitably involve 
intersecting terms including cognitive justice, “decolonisation of knowledge and infusion of 
indigenous knowledge systems in the curriculum depending on how one interprets each term” 
(Leibowitz 2017, 110). 
The term “African” “refers to people and their philosophies, cultures, and practices 
originally identified with the geographical region, the continent of Africa, irrespective of 
whether such peoples live currently on the continent or abroad” (Quampah et al. 2016, 855). 
The proponents of African epistemology argue that the location of the African continent, its 
human history, and the experience of African peoples result in distinctive ways of 
understanding and the world and human condition (Jimoh 1999; Nkulu-N’Sengha 2005). There 
are suggestions that African communities have their African epistemologies that are distinct 
from those of Western societies used to frame descriptions of external objects or reality 
(Airoboman and Asekhauno 2012). This account suggests that distinctive cultures of the 
African peoples mean that realities will not be understood and interpreted the same way as in 
other cultures outside the continent (Nkulu-N’Sengha 2005).  
Social justice in South Africa is enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of South 
Africa, which prescribes non-racialism as the cornerstone of policy and practice for post-
apartheid society (Republic of South Africa 1996). The Constitution highlights equity, fairness, 
respect for human rights, dignity, cultural diversity, and equality of treatment irrespective of 
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race, gender, religion or ideology. Non-racialism is emphasised because both colonialism and 
apartheid were founded on a system that promoted discrimination against the black majority, 
including denying them equal educational opportunities (Badat and Sayed 2014). The focus of 
equity was to increase the participation and success rates of black students, including women 
students, in programmes and levels in which they are underrepresented (ibid.). Thus, non-racial 
treatment as a standard of equity is a necessary factor in building a socially just society and 
higher education (Dunne and Sayed 2002; Badat 2008; Fiske and Ladd 2004). 
Accordingly, the meaning of social justice has become more urgent as South Africa enters 
its third decade of democracy, especially with increasing demands to decolonise the higher 
education curriculum. Although the decolonisation movement dates back to the 1960s when 
African countries gained independence, it was given impetus by the recent #Feesmustfall 
student movement (Fataar 2018; Heleta 2016). These demands have rekindled the decolonial 
narratives concerning social justice epistemologies and what forms they should take, in order 
to realise a socially just higher education in the post-colonial context (see Mbembe 2015; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). These narratives maintain that curricula introduced by colonial 
countries and subsequently by the apartheid regime in South Africa promoted values of white 
community while reinforcing African stereotypes and thereby aggravated injustice (see Badat 
and Sayed 2014).  
Given this context, the principle of equality of opportunity must be realised in relation to 
provision, access, and outcomes that could be achieved through equal recognition regarding 
race, gender, or ethnicity (Badat 2008, 12). Although important, equality of treatment and 
opportunity could not in itself eliminate historical and structural educational inequalities 
resulting from apartheid institutions (Badat and Sayed 2014). Consequently, formal equality 
that underplays inherited and structurally produced inequalities cannot redress the inequities in 
South Africa, making it necessary to distinguish formal equality from equity (Badat and Sayed 
2014, 128). The former refers to the “principle of sameness” and to uniformity and 
standardisation; the latter is concerned with proactively fair and just treatment, and is therefore 
key to achieving substantive equality by inter alia enforcing positive discrimination in favour 
of groups that were and are still disadvantaged, and ensuring social progression of 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups (Badat and Sayed 2014, 128).  
Leibowitz introduced the notion of “cognitive justice” that would ensure that the equality 
of knowers forms the foundation for “dialogue among knowers and their knowledges to 
advance democracy” (2017). It is argued that the proposed social justice pedagogy is necessary 
to conscientise people to existing structural inequalities and more importantly, to conscientise 
students to challenge existing institutionalised cultural patterns and frameworks in order to 
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achieve participatory parity (Leibowitz and Bozalek 2015b).  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Relativist epistemologies of social justice 
African epistemologies and the decolonization movement in South Africa locate social justice 
within the power relations of post-colonial and apartheid contexts, arguing that oppressed 
groups need to reclaim their epistemologies by reconstructing the world according to their own 
interests rather than according to the interests of former colonial powers.  
Given the geopolitical location of Africa and South Africa, architects of the decolonisation 
movement and subsequent decolonial movement argue that a socially just higher education 
could be advanced by recognizing a variety of archives in the curricula, including archives of 
African and Western epistemologies. Although not explicitly stated, claims for the recognition 
of multiplicities of knowledge, epistemological archives, and diverse understandings of social 
justice within the decolonialilty narrative resonate with relativist epistemologies. 
Relativist epistemology makes the implicit claim that because African people have their 
ways of understanding the world and reality, and their own cultural beliefs and values, social 
justice need to be understood within the particular geopolitical setting of post-colonialism and 
post-apartheid ideology in South Africa. Thus, the concept of social justice embracing equality, 
equity and justness, and the recognition of differences in race and ethnicity, makes sense within 
a particular historical and political context that mirrors unequal power relations. Social justice 
in these terms must be realised through decoloniality and deracialization projects that aim to 
address inequity. The multiplicity of epistemologies of different groups implies that not only 
do Africans have their distinct epistemologies from those outside the African contexts, but also 
have distinct epistemologies within the African contexts.  
In response to pedagogical practices informed by liberal theories, both critical pedagogy 
and socially just pedagogy have been advanced to empower students to challenge current 
epistemologies that are not only foreign, but also alienate students from their environment 
through curricula that exclude indigenous knowledge and epistemologies (see Leibowitz and 
Bozalek 2015b; De Sousa Santos 2001). The recognition of differences explains why equity is 
considered most the appropriate to achieve substantive equality (see Badat and Sayed 2014).  
The discussions suggest that social justice in the relativist position is predicated on a 
context-dependent theory of knowledge that recognises social construction and experiences in 
establishing knowledge claims about a theory of knowledge of social justice that in turn 
recognises indigenous. This version implies that there can be no shared ontology of social 
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justice and socially just higher education as these terms are open to varying interpretations, 
depending on contexts. 
Similarly, although proponents of decoloniality are critical of the decolonisation 
movement for basing their critique on a Marxist ideology, the narrative of decoloniality equally 
draws on the neo-Marxist paradigm of unequal power relations where epistemologies and 
pedagogies of the former colonial power are used to “negate” epistemologies and pedagogies 
of the African people long after the decolonisation process has been completed (see Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2013, 10).  
 
Ontological properties and attributes of social justice 
I argue that while the existence of multiplicities of epistemologies are an integral part of post-
colonial and post-apartheid societies, it is possible and desirable to identify some ontological 
properties and attributes of social justice that transcend contexts and therefore exist 
independently of our thoughts even in countries as diverse in terms of race, cultures and 
epistemologies such as South Africa. These overlapping properties and attributes are 
democracy, citizenship, recognition of differences, race, and ethnicities. In terms of the R and 
CR perspectives, concepts of democracy, citizenship, race, equality, differences and recognition 
embrace the real, actual and empirical domains. These structures, I argue, surpass accounts of 
causation of social justice that confine the real to events of social justice and negates existence 
of underlying structures and objects (see Collier 1994). Significantly, it is argued that while this 
is clearly debatable, these properties and attributes are not necessarily reducible to ideologies, 
beliefs or power relations that are clearly understood within particular contexts of particular 
scientific communities in South Africa. These attributes are discussed below in the current post-
colonial and post-apartheid settings. 
First, the concept of democracy which implies promotion of equality, fairness and 
consensus has the real, actual and empirical aspects of social justice that cut across South 
African society, and therefore exists independent of different groups in the country. In 
particular, democracy entails protection of the human rights of all citizens, and respect for rule 
of law that applies to all is equally enshrined in the Constitution (Republic of South Africa 
1996). I therefore argue that respect and protection of human rights of all and the rule of law 
are foundations of democracy. This description suggests that democracy is something to which 
all in society should aspire in order to create a socially just society. Conversely, policies and 
practices that do not advocate these values cannot be considered to advance social justice. In 
this context, the role of educational institutions in democratic states is key in instilling the spirit 
of citizenry, advancements of civil rights and dignity, and tolerance for differences, regardless 
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of contexts. Higher education institutions cannot be expected to mirror the South African 
society in which they are located, but rather challenge explicit though sometimes hidden 
injustices propagated by colonialism and apartheid.  
Second, the concept of citizenship encompassing social responsibility and social 
consciousness as a component of social justice similarly exist as independent reality 
transcending particular contexts of different groups in South Africa (see Pierre, Jochem and 
Jahn 2016). Social responsibility and social consciousness mean that citizens and students have 
a duty to promote justice in societies in different contexts. These values existing as real, actual 
and empirical counters contextual explanations of social justice that may be shaped by people’s 
thoughts, cultures, ideological beliefs and experiences. Thus, citizenship as an ontology implies 
that people should exhibit social awareness, self-responsibility and self-worth regardless of 
their particular ideologies and epistemologies (cf. Hall, Williamson and Coffey 2000).  
Regardless of diverse epistemologies and ideologies in South Africa therefore, it is 
inconceivable to make any claim of advancing social justice unless a sense of social 
responsibility and social consciousness is instilled in students through the curriculum.  
Third, the recognition of differences in social justice conversations especially in countries 
such as South Africa with its dark historical past involves respect for diversities; 
acknowledgement of past wrongs and of those who suffered from them (see Govier 1999); and 
respect for indigenous knowledge systems. These elements are an integral part of the process 
of building a just society, with higher education playing a critical role. Recognition refers to 
granting of equal rights to all members of society which promotes their self-respect as fully 
included citizens, and acceptance of different groups. Notably, recognition of cultural practices, 
minority groups, physical disabilities, linguistic groups, and values of various groups as part of 
social justice reality transcends contexts. I argue that regardless of contexts, these values form 
part of the process of building a just South Africa as the country enters its third decade of 
democratic freedom. 
Fourth, the features of social justice that have generated much discussion and 
disagreement relate to whether race and ethnicity can ever exist as independent realities 
(ontologies) elsewhere and in South Africa (Bell 1992). I have specifically appropriated R, CR 
and RRT to explore the extent to which race could be considered an independent reality, given 
that social injustices during colonial and apartheid were perpetuated on the basis of race and 
ethnicity. Race and ethnicity in the discussions of social justice encompass nation or 
nationhood, cultural and racial groups, tribes and indigenous groups. RRT is especially 
canvassed to provide an account of race, given that the notion of non-racialism and associated 
policy may unintentionally undermine attainment of social justice and human rights of groups 
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of Africans in the post-apartheid setting (Ntshoe 2017, 72) 
In particular, race, ethnicity and tribalism are emotional terms inextricably linked to 
colonialism and apartheid. Race, ethnicity and tribalism were two powerful instruments to 
perpetuate and institutionalise injustices and discrimination against certain population groups 
during the colonial period. This explains why people who have been affected by discriminatory 
practices find it difficult to delink race and ethnicity as social justice concepts, as distinct from 
colonialism and apartheid ideology and beliefs. 
I argue that despite these misgivings, racial realist and ethnicity ontologies are two 
properties of social justice that exist outside our thoughts and are therefore not necessarily tied 
to social constructs of people with diverse races, ethnicity and multiple realities in South Africa. 
Race as an ontology of social justice in my article is distinct from racism which describes a 
prejudiced belief that one race is superior to others, and similarly that certain ethnic and tribal 
groups are superior to others. This means that race as an independent reality of social justice 
can exist independently of racism in different contexts. However, even though the two concepts 
are often erroneously used interchangeably, race exists as an independent reality of social 
justice.  
This ontologised view of race or racial realist attributes of social justice challenges the 
epistemology of positivism regarding social justice, which asserts that firstly, the term race can 
be subjected to scientific verification and therefore be explained in terms of logical or 
mathematical proof as was the case during apartheid (see Bell 1992). Secondly, that the element 
of race in the framework of social justice can be understood through experience and observable 
events, and thirdly, that everything about race in the analysis of social justice can be intelligibly 
and rationally explained (c.f. Bell 1992; 2004; see Ntshoe 2017). 
In contrast, the ontologised race element of social justice in my article recognises 
nationhood, people of different races, tribes and ethnic groups to advance social justice regardless 
of racial differences. Significantly, it is inconceivable to understand how fairness, justness, 
gender parity and recognition of racial, ethnic and other minorities could be achieved if these 
concepts are not recognised as realities existing independently of our minds. I argue therefore 
that denial of race as a reality existing independently of our thoughts by implication denies 
existence of differences as one of the key concepts in advancing social justice. In South Africa 
such a seeming denunciation of race expressed in the vocabulary of non-racialism and non-
sexism as policies is aimed at addressing discriminatory practices against people of difference 
races and femininity.  
Three features of Bell’s theory germane to discussions on advancing social justice in South 
Africa are, first, the rejection of erroneous misuse of terminology in asserting that there is only 
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one human race (see Bell 1992). Second, is Bell’s critique of the supreme court decision that 
rejected the “separate but equal” doctrine in its entirety. Accordingly, Bell’s RRT provides a 
useful framework to question the humanist account built on rationality of race in the context of 
racial equality and conventional structures of law in South Africa which assume that a just 
society can be created if the laws are properly applied (Bell 1995; see Ntshoe 2017). Drawing 
on Bell, therefore, I argue that South African society contains many races instead of just one 
human race to which all human beings belong in contrast with diverse animal groups. In the 
light of the arguments above, it is asserted that the racial status of different racial groups should 
be embraced. Drawing from Bell’s formulation, Blacks specifically should retain their racial 
identity rather than denying its existence as this would place them in a better position to 
challenge both explicit and sometimes hidden racism (Bell 1992). Third is the argument that 
the decision in Brown vs Board of Education should have compelled the retention of the “equal” 
part of the “separate but equal” principle. The implication of this claim for my article is that 
social justice could be better served if the “equal” part was upheld as this would force 
governments to develop under-privileged communities and minority groups in South Africa.  
This argument raises an interesting issue in addressing the effects of “separate but equal” 
doctrine during the apartheid era. Contrary to the general belief that both “separate” and “equal” 
policies are obsolete to address social justice in the post-apartheid society, I argue that social 
justice context be better served if the “equal” part of the defunct “separate and but equal” 
doctrine is resuscitated in the South Africa despite multiple diversities and epistemologies. This 
proposition would force the government in the democratic context in South Africa to focus 
specifically on the development of under-privileged communities and minority groups in order 
to advance social justice. In particular, this proposal implies that well-managed resources from 
national government, provinces and municipalities should be made available to provide decent 
housing, clean water and proper sanitary facilities that ensure observation of human rights, 
dignity and respect for townships and informal settlements to advance social justice.  
In education the proposition suggests that instead of encouraging parents from townships 
to send their children to former model C schools (schools located in urban areas and originally 
built for privileged “white” communities by the previous government) through bussing system 
of the type that has not succeeded in in accelerating desegregation in the US, and other legal 
means, the government could invest in developing townships and schools attended exclusively 
by “Black” children to the same status as former model C schools (See Ntshoe 2017). 
Furthermore, the “equal” part of social justice can be advanced by not only renewing and 
rehabilitating schools that were built for, and exclusively attended by Blacks. Most of these 
schools lack basic equipment, are not provided with security to protect buildings, teachers and 
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learners as in all former Model C schools and have either inadequate, or no spaces for sports 
facilities. 
Similarly, genuine social justice could be enhanced if the state spends more resources to 
improve historically disadvantaged higher learning institutions and making them attractive to 
students. This involves provision of proper and safe accommodation with proper security for 
students. However, much has been done to build capacity of historically disadvantaged 
institutions through earmarked funding for infrastructure development in these institutions, 
including recently, the skewed allocation of the National Students Funding Scheme (NSFAS) 
in favour of students most of them Black in the disadvantaged higher education institutions 
most of which are located either urban townships or in rural areas.  
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